This paper empirically examine whether the way African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings is influenced by capital market motivations and the type of auditor after controlling for non- 
Introduction
The question whether banks use loan loss provisions (LLP) to manipulate reported earnings is examined by a large empirical literature and the literature report mixed conclusions (Ahmed et al, 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Anandarajan et al, 2007; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; El Sood, 2012; Parker and Zhu, 2012) . Some developed country studies examine income smoothing practices among banks in US, Europe, Australia and Asia (see. El Sood, 2012; Leventis et al, 2011; Ozili, 2017; Anandarajan et al, 2007; Parker and Zhu, 2012) , while related studies examine other cross-country contexts (e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008) . Recently, few studies in Africa have emerged and focus on provisions-based earnings smoothing in a single country context (see. Ahmed et al, 2014; Ozili, 2015) . To date, there is little knowledge about provisions-based earnings smoothing practices across African countries. In this paper, we undertake a cross-country analysis of income smoothing via loan loss provisions for African banks. One merit of country-specific studies is that it takes into account the fact that banks across African countries face unique conditions and have dissimilar rules regarding the accounting for loan loss provisions compared to banking institutions in US and Europe. However, it is common practice to investigate whether banks in a region exhibit similar financial reporting behavior with a focus on banks' earnings smoothing behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings and whether this behavior is influenced by the type of bank auditor and whether the bank is listed or non-listed. Evidence for the use of loan loss provisions to smooth income derives from the positive and significant relation between loan loss provisions and pre-provisions earnings in the literature. By dividing African banks into listed and non-listed category, the main argument is that African banks driven by capital market considerations will use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings possibly to minimize stock price fluctuations. With respect to the type of auditor, the main argument is that the presence of Big 4 auditor in a bank reflects superior audit quality and should deter earnings smoothing practices.
For the purpose of this paper, earnings smoothing is a form of earnings management behavior because it convey the idea that banks have incentives to lower too high earnings and to increase too low earnings. We focus on the use of loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings because prior studies identify loan loss provisions to be an important earnings smoothing tool in the banking industry due to its direct impact on bank net interest margin and its role in bank credit risk management (Wall and Koch, 2000) . The findings indicate that listed African banks significantly use loan loss provisions to smooth income. Also, the findings indicate that African banks audited by Big 4 auditor use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings more than African banks audited by non-Big 4 auditor, and imply that the presence of Big 4 auditor, often associated with superior audit quality, did not discourage the use of loan loss provisions to smooth income, and suggests that the presence of Big 4 auditor does not improve the informativeness or reliability of loan loss provisions estimates among African banks.
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, the findings in the paper contribute to the bank earning management literature. The study provides the first cross-country evidence on earnings smoothing via loan loss provisions across a large sample of 302 African banks. By providing evidence that African banks smooth income, the finding suggests that provisions-based earnings smoothing practice of banks is a widespread earnings management practice across the globe, even in Africa.
Second, the findings in this paper contribute to the debate on procyclical and countercyclical (dynamic) provisioning in the banking literature. Our evidence for procyclical provisioning behavior among African bank supports the debate to adopt a dynamic loan loss provisioning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection criteria and methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. The term 'income smoothing' and 'earnings smoothing' are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Income Smoothing Hypothesis
Income smoothing involves minimizing the fluctuation of reported earnings over time. The income smoothing hypothesis argue that banks decrease high earnings in good years and increase low earnings in bad years to report stable earnings over time (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988 ). An extensive literature document evidence that bank managers use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings (e.g. Leventis et al, 2011; El Sood, 2012; Ozili, 2017) . Some cross-country studies also document evidence that banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income after controlling for country-level differences (e.g. Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Parker and Zhu, 2012) . For instance, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) examine income smoothing practices among banks across 41 countries and find that income smoothing behavior decreases among banks in countries with strong investor protection, accounting disclosure, restrictions on bank activities, official and private supervision. In addition, they find that provisions-based income smoothing increases with market-orientation and financial system development. Leventis et al (2011) examine provisioning practices among 91 listed European banks and find evidence for income smoothing among European banks and the income smoothing behavior is significantly reduced after mandatory IFRS adoption. Similar studies also examine bank income smoothing practices in Asia (Parker and Zhu, 2012) and in emerging European countries (Bonin and Kosak, 2013) and find evidence for income smoothing. Jointly, the above studies draw inference based on the statistical relation between provisions and earnings before tax and provisions. While a positive and significant coefficient for the earnings before tax and provisions variable is indicative of income smoothing, it is unknown whether similar or conflicting evidence may be found among African banks.
Few African studies examine income smoothing practices in a single country context (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2014; Yahaya et al, 2015; Ozili, 2015) . Ahmed et al (2014) examine earnings management through the use of loan loss provision among deposit money banks in Nigeria and find evidence that loan loss provisions is used to manage earnings. Ozili (2015) examine the income smoothing behavior of listed Nigerian banks during the voluntary IFRS adoption period and document evidence for income smoothing among listed banks in Nigeria. In contrast, Yahaya et al (2015) investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management behavior of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. They focus their study on how the change in the recognition and measurement of banks' loan loss provision affects earnings management behavior. They did not find a significant difference in the earnings management behavior of banks in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS. The present study extends this growing strand of literature by investigating bank income smoothing practices for a wide sample of African countries while controlling for other influences on bank provisioning behavior.
Capital Market Motivations
There is the argument that banks smooth earnings because smoothed earnings reduce the variability of earnings which further translate into reduced stock price volatility. Anandarajan et al (2007) demonstrate that if smoothed earnings reduce stock price fluctuation, then listed banks will have some incentive to smooth income to minimize stock price fluctuation and the volatility of stock return. This view argues that existing and potential investors view stable stock price as a good signal for high stock return, which in turn create incentives for managers of listed banks to smooth earnings to stabilize share prices. Anandarajan et al (2007) in their study compare the provisions-based income smoothing behavior of listed banks and non-listed banks in Australia. They find evidence that listed Australian banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income more than non-listed Australian banks, and conclude that listed Australian banks use provisions to smooth income for capital market reasons.
Similarly, Leventis et al (2011) examine the case of listed European banks across 18 countries during the 1999 to 2008 period and document evidence that listed EU banks use provisions to smooth income but the income smoothing behavior is significantly reduced in the post mandatory IFRS period. Both study use bank earnings rather than stock returns to test for capital market motivations. With respect to African banks, Ozili (2015) examine listed banks in Nigeria and find evidence for income smoothing via provisions. To date, there is yet no cross-country evidence that examine whether, or not, listed African banks use provisions to smooth earnings relative to non-listed African banks.
Therefore, this paper also tests whether listed African banks and non-listed African banks exhibit a significant difference in their provisions-based income smoothing behavior. Consistent with the above argument, the prediction is that listed African banks will use provisions to smooth income more aggressively than non-listed African banks.
Auditor Choice
A firm would choose the services of a Big 4 auditor than non-Big 4 auditor if they believe that the reputation of Big 4 auditors reflect superior audit quality (Blackwell et al, 1998) . Teoh and Wong (1993) and Francis et al (1999) More importantly, the type of auditor of a firm is considered to be important for industries where information uncertainty is higher relative to other industries (Billingsley and Schneller, 2009 ). For instance, the complexity of banking operations and the difficulty to assess the risk of large loan portfolio further contribute to widen the information asymmetry problem between bank owners and managers. Hence, to ensure that managers disclose decision-useful and sufficient information to bank owners, shareholders (or board of directors) are more likely to insist on the need to employ the services of Big 4 auditors with the expectation of superior audit quality (Kanagaretnam et al, 2010) . Kanagaretnam et al (2010) show that the presence of Big 4 auditor moderates the extent of bank income smoothing via loan loss provisions, that is, income smoothing is not significantly pronounced or reduced. Following the above argument, the prediction is that there will be less income smoothing behavior among African banks with Big 4 auditor relative to African banks with non-Big 4 auditor.
Procyclicality
The behavior of bank provisions is often considered to reinforce the current state of the business cycle, implying that bank loan loss provisions exhibits procyclical behavior (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) . During economic upturns (or economic boom), banks report fewer problem loans and the level of provisions is usually low. Conversely, during economic downturns provisions increase because expected loan defaults are high and the size of provisions is expected to significantly increase if a recession persist (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) . However, there is evidence that banks have incentives to overstate provisions (rather than lower provisions) during economic booms in order to lower too high profit that might attract scrutiny from regulators. Liu and Ryan (2006) observe that more profitable banks increase loan loss provisions to lower too high earnings during the 1990 economic boom while El Sood (2012) find that banks increase loan loss provisions to smooth income downwards when they are more profitable and when they are in nonrecessionary periods. Consistent with these studies, real gross domestic product growth rate is used to control for fluctuation in the business cycle.
Data and Methodology
Data and Sample Selection Criteria
Pooled cross-section and time-series bank income statement and balance sheet data is obtained for 19 economies in Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. The sample period cover 2004 to 2013 and is sufficient to cover a full economic cycle (i.e., a 10-year period). Bank-level balance sheet and income statement data is obtained from Van Dijk Bankscope database while macroeconomic data on real gross domestic product growth rate for each jurisdiction is obtained from the World Economic Forum archived in World Bank database.
Description of variables and data source is presented in Table 1A .
[Insert Table 1A] Data was obtained for 347 banks from Bankscope database. To clean up the data, African banks with observations for crucial variables (e.g. loan loss provisions, earnings, etc.) for less than three consecutive years were excluded to control for the quality of bank reporting. 45 African banks were excluded that did not report data for crucial variables. The sample is then reduced to 302 banks. auditor. See Table 1B for data distribution.
[Insert Table 1B] 3.2. Methodology
To test the propensity to use provisions to smooth earnings, the baseline model specification is given by:
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provision to bank total asset. EBTP is the ratio of earnings before taxes and provisions to total asset. LOAN is the change in gross loan outstanding. NPL is the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loan. CAR is the ratio of Tier 1 bank capital to risk-weighted assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. CFEER is the ratio of net commission and fee income to total asset. ΔGDP is the real gross domestic product growth rate.
The model estimates the propensity to use loan loss provisions to smooth income after controlling for differences in nonperforming loans, loan growth, tier 1 capital ratio, size, commission and fee income and gross domestic product growth rate. The model is estimated using panel least square with White's robust standard error correction, as well as, with and without period fixed effect.
The income smoothing variable of interest is EBTP. A positive sign on EBTP coefficient is indicative of bank income smoothing via loan loss provisions. Loan growth (LOAN) is a proxy for contemporaneous credit risk (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) . A positive sign on LOAN coefficient
indicates that loan loss provisions increases as loan supply increases due to contemporaneous credit risk concerns. However, Lobo and Yang (2001) point out that a negative relation may be expected if banks lower provisions due to improved quality of incremental loans. Non-performing loans (NPL)
capture the riskiness of bank loan portfolio. A positive sign on the NPL coefficient is predicted because banks will increase provision when they expect loan defaults (Beaver and Engel, 1996) .
CAR is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, and control for the use of provisions to manage regulatory capital (e.g. Kilic et al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013) . The capital management hypothesis argues that banks are more likely to use discretionary provisions to increase regulatory capital levels to avoid the costs associated with violating minimum regulatory capital requirements (Ahmed et al, 1999) . Consistent with Kilic et al (2012) and Bonin and Kosak (2013) , a negative sign on CAR coefficient is expected.
The use of the natural logarithm of total asset (SIZE) as a proxy for bank size is consistent with Kilic et al (2012) and Ozili (2015) . Large banks are considered to have higher levels of business activities and may set aside higher provisions to commensurate for their high business levels relative to smaller banks, hence, a positive sign on SIZE coefficient is expected (Anandarajan et al, 2007) . Hasan and Hunter (1994) suggest that higher fees and commission income (CFEER) for banks may indicate an interest in non-depository banking activities and banks may allocate additional reserves (or provisions) to mitigate risk arising from providing multiple services that are non-depository in nature.
Following this reasoning, a positive sign is expected on the CFEER coefficient.
At country level, real gross domestic product growth rate (ΔGDP) control for provisioning that depend on the state of the economic cycle (Leaven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) . BIG4 dummy variable take the value of '1' for African banks with Big 4 auditor and '0' for African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. LISTED dummy variable take the value of '1' if the bank is listed and '0' otherwise.
Finally, to test the influence of bank-type on income smoothing behavior among African banks, each bank-type dummy is interacted with the bank income smoothing variable. The coefficients of each interaction term measure the influence of the bank-type on provisions-based income smoothing among African banks. The incorporation of interaction terms is the main rationale for using separate regressions rather than a single regression with sandwiched variables. On average, CFEER is 2% for both banks and suggest that both banks have similar incentive to engage in non-depository activities. Finally, the difference of means between listed African banks and non-listed African banks is low and SIZE has the highest mean difference indicating that listed banks are larger than non-listed African banks.
Discussion of Results
Descriptive Statistics
For the Big 4 and non-Big 4 category, the mean value of LLP is 1%, respectively; and suggests that there is no significant difference in LLPs for both banks. NPLs are, on average, 7.27% and 9.19%, and indicate that banks with Big 4 auditors report lower NPLs than banks with non-Big 4 auditor.
Also, banks with Big 4 auditor record lower CAR compared to banks with non-Big 4 auditor. Also, LOAN is lower for banks with Big 4 auditor. Also, total assets (SIZE) are marginally higher for banks with Big 4 auditor compared to banks with non-Big 4, and suggest that large African banks are more likely to employ the services of a Big 4 auditor compared to smaller African banks. CFEER is higher for banks with Big 4 auditor and imply that banks with Big 4 auditor have higher interest in nondepository activities compared to banks with non-Big 4 auditor. Finally, the difference of means for EBTP and LLP variables are sufficiently low (i.e., about 1% for EBTP and 0% for LLP) for both bank categories and implies that the average values do not convey much difference in the earnings and provisions estimates of the two bank categories.
[Insert Table 2A&B here] 4.2. Correlations Table 3A [Insert Table 4 reports the main results. EBTP coefficient reports a positive and significant sign at the 1% level in Column 1, indicating that African banks use provisions to smooth bank earnings during the period of analysis. This is consistent with Anandarajan et al (2007) and Ozili (2015 Ozili ( , 2017 , and implies that African banks increase provisions estimates to lower high earnings and report lower Three, the existence of weak bank supervision and legal enforcement institutions in the region might also create weak incentive for Big 4 auditors to provide superior audit quality for banks in the region so as to retain their bank clients who pay for the favorable audit services offered to them.
[Insert Table 4 here] 4.4. Sensitivity Analysis:
Sub-Sample
The full sample is divided into four subsamples to check whether the main result (Table 4) is sensitive to sub-sample bank category. EBTP is the variable of interest and Table 5 report the results. EBTP coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level in Column 1 of Table 5 , indicating that African banks use provisions to smooth earnings for capital market reasons. This confirms the earlier result and is consistent with the argument of Anandarajan et al (2007) . On the other hand, EBTP coefficient is not significant for non-listed African banks in Column 2 of Table 5 . This indicates that income smoothing via provisions is not significantly associated with non-listed African banks. Overall, this confirms the earlier result (see Table 4 ) that bank income smoothing via provisions is more pronounced among listed banks compared to non-listed banks. For African banks with Big 4 auditor, EBTP coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level in Column 3 of Table 5 , and imply that bank income smoothing is pronounced among African banks with Big 4 auditor compared to African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. On the other hand, EBTP coefficient is positive but not significant for African banks with non-Big 4 auditor in Column 4 of non-Big 4 auditor take the value '0'. The same procedure is applied to the non-listed bank subsample.
In the Big 4 subsample, banks that are also listed take the value '1' and banks that are not listed take the value '0'. The sample procedure is applied to the non-Big 4 subsample. The variables of interest are the interaction variables in each subsample. The results are reported in Table 6 . LISTED*EBTP and BIG4*EBTP coefficients are statistically insignificant. The result does not confirm earlier result in Table 4 . Additionally, Column 4 of Table 4 use two-way interaction terms based on the full sample. [Insert Table 6 here]
Country-Specific Regression
Further, we recognize the bias associated with cross-country analysis because it fails to take into account national characteristics that might affect bank provisions-based income smoothing practices.
Thus, we run additional country-specific regression to minimize this bias. The result is reported in Table 6 . After applying White's robust standard error correction, cross-country variations in provisions-based income smoothing can be observed. However, the reported sign for EBTP for most countries is positive and consistent with the prediction. Only few countries report a negative sign.
Also, there is evidence of provisions-based earnings smoothing among banks in Uganda, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Cameroun, and Ethiopia, while there is no evidence of provisions-based income smoothing practices in other African countries in our sample. The positive but insignificant sign on EBTP coefficient for some countries might be due to the small number of sample banks in the country analysis.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Summary and Conclusion
This paper explores the use of discretionary provisions to smooth earnings by African banks after controlling for non-discretionary provisions and macroeconomic fluctuation. Tanzania  0  16  12  4  16  Togo  1  6  2  5  7  Tunisia  14  12  3  23  26  Uganda  3  18  16  5  21  Zambia  2  12  13  1  14  Total  74  228  179 Table 3A : Full Sample Correlation Matrix Panel A report the correlation matrix. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. LLP is loan loss provision. EBTP is earnings before taxes and provisions to total asset ratio. CFEER is net commission and fee income to total asset ratio. LOAN is the change in gross loan outstanding. NPL is non-performing loan to gross loan. CAR is Tier 1 capital ratio to risk-weighted assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total asset. ΔGDP is gross domestic product growth rate. LISTED take the value '1' if the bank is listed and '0' otherwise. BIG4 take the value '1' if the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor, otherwise, '0'. 
